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America's Longest War:
At 20, Roe Conflict Enters New Era
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Washington Post
January 22, 1993
Wanda Franz remembers where she was 20 years
ago today when the Supreme Court handed down Roe
v. Wade. She was in the cafeteria at West Virginia
University, and a woman who knew Franz had
spoken out against abortion shouted at her, "You can
go home now. It's over."
Hardly.
Meant to solve a problem, Roe v. Wade, the
monumental ruling that made abortion legal
nationwide, incited a war that has shut down
legislatures, divided political parties and splintered
families. It took on a woman's intensely personal
dilemma and made it the focus of an enduring and
glaringly public debate.
Strife over the issue has been so bitter and
sustained that the only comparison that comes close
is the country's conflict over race. Abortion
opponents expect tens of thousands of protesters to
march to the Supreme Court and Capitol today, part
of what has become their yearly anniversary ritual.
The war is far from over. Battles have only shifted
venues over the past two decades, from the Supreme
Court, to statehouses, Congress, back to the court. It
has been fought in front of clinics, at political
conventions, always in homes.
In Roe, the court ruled 7 to 2 that state laws
making abortion a crime infringed upon the 14th
Amendment's due process guarantee of personal
liberty, which, the majority said, protects a woman's
decision whether to have a child.
But the ruling only led to more questions. Should
the government pay for abortions for poor women?
Must a husband or parents be told? Could the tissue
of aborted fetuses be used in important medical
research?
Each issue raises more dilemmas. Choice vs. life.
Equality vs. responsibility. Symbolic coat hangers vs.
pictures of developing fetuses.
Now, a whole new era of abortion conflict is
beginning.
The election of President Clinton, a supporter of
abortion rights, and a court ruling last June affirming
most of Roe but inviting state regulation, changed the
battleground once again.
Clinton has promised to lift - perhaps as early as
today - the Bush administration's "gag order"
restricting abortion counseling in clinics that receive
federal funds. He has also said he may end the ban
on funding for research on fetal tissue.
Abortion opponents are bracing for a fight.
"People are really ready to work now," said Franz,
who is president of the National Right to Life
Committee, a group that plans to step up its lobbying
of state legislatures for more abortion limits. Franz,
a student at West Virginia University in 1973, is now
a professor of child development there.
Meanwhile, abortion rights advocates still are
reeling from 12 years of Republican administrations
that opposed abortion and a conservative Supreme
Court that, despite affirming Roe, made it easier for
states to restrict abortion.
"We have to recoup a lot of losses from the last 12
years, " said Janet Benshoof, who last year began a
new advocacy organization in New York City
dedicated to preserving abortion rights. "We're just
realizing how far back we are."
The future of abortion rights hangs on how far
states push restrictions and how the Supreme Court
assesses whether those limits are an "undue burden"
on women seeking abortions. The court, in last
June's ruling, said an undue burden exists if
substantial obstacles are placed in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus is viable,
that is, can live outside the womb.
It is a new standard and one not yet defined.
Fearing that states might pass laws that significantly
impede access to abortion, abortion rights supporters
have been lobbying Congress to pass the proposed
Freedom of Choice Act, which would greatly limit
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state abortion regulation.
"While there is a mood among the laity that maybe
things have calmed down," said syndicated columnist
Nat Hentoff, who switched sides to oppose abortion
nine years ago, "they haven't."
Profound Questions, Fundamental Values
What is it about abortion that the issue remains
salient at a time when six of the nine Roe justices
have died or retired?
Abortion raises questions about the beginnings of
life and equally profound questions about
individualism and privacy.
To many people, abortion means equality for
women; and to many women, it invokes conflicts
about motherhood, control of one's own body and
destiny. In the background is sexuality, challenging
the country's Puritan origins.
Abortion rouses religious convictions and lifestyle
differences. Some conservatives equate abortion with
loose morals and a lack of "family values." Liberals
say the need for abortion is a human reality and that
the country must allow for a safe and accessible
option to end a pregnancy.
Polls - including one conducted last week by The
Washington Post - show that most people fall into a
conflicted middle, believing in a right to abortion but
also saying it should be exercised rarely, such as
when a woman's health is threatened or in cases of
rape or incest. The Alan Guttmacher Institute, which
collects national statistics on abortion, reports that no
single reason predominates in women's choices to
have an abortion. Most women who end their
pregnancies say having a baby would conflict with
work, school or other responsibilities and that they
could not afford a child.
Since 1973, more than 22 million legal abortions
have been performed, with the current annual count
estimated at 1.6 million. The aging of the baby boom
generation and increased use of birth control appear
to have contributed to a leveling off of the abortion
rate and a downward trend in the ratio of abortions to
live births, according to the Guttmacher Institute.
From the start, the Supreme Court has steered the
debate, either by shutting out lawmakers or, now, by
enticing their involvement in defining abortion rights.
Roe v. Wade said a state could interfere with a
woman's "fundamental" right to abortion only if it
had a "compelling interest." During the first three
months of pregnancy, the court said, states must
leave the abortion decision to a woman. During the
second trimester, a state could impose restrictions
intended to safeguard the mother's health. Only after
the sixth month of pregnancy could abortion be
prohibited, but not if it is necessary to save the
mother's life or health.
Under that framework, most restrictions on
abortion were found invalid.
The first departure from Roe came in the court's
1989 ruling in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services. In a 5 to 4 ruling, the court upheld a
Missouri abortion law that an appeals court had found
inconsistent with Roe. The law's preamble said "the
life of each human being begins at conception" and
"unborn children have protectable interests in life,
health, and well-being."
The law barred using public employees and
facilities for abortion and required that before a
woman who may have been pregnant 20 or more
weeks could obtain an abortion, a physician first had
to determine whether the fetus could survive outside
the womb.
The Supreme Court did not produce the five votes
needed to overturn Roe, although a majority
criticized it and Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the
author of Roe, said the court was implicitly inviting
state legislatures to enact more restrictions on
abortion.
Pennsylania, under the leadership of its
antiabortion Gov. Robert P. Casey (D), adopted new
abortion limits in 1989, and its law came to the court
in last June's Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.
There, justices upheld requirements that women
seeking abortions be given information discouraging
the procedure and that physicians wait at least 24
hours before performing an abortion; that minors
obtain parental permission; and that clinics collect
and make public certain information on abortions
performed. (Polling has shown that a large majority
of Americans support parental and spousal
notification laws and waiting periods.)
Most significant in the Casey ruling, the court by
7 to 2 discarded the trimester framework of Roe and
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its strict test for state regulation.
The plurality in Casey said the standard now
should be whether a regulation puts an "undue
burden" on a woman seeking an abortion.
Activists on both sides of the abortion debate
expect the so-far loosely defined "undue burden"
standard to lead states to test the outer limits, the
lower courts to craft their own interpretations, and
the Supreme Court ultimately to decide - again -
how far states may go.
"What happened with Casey," Franz said, "is that
the courts finally opened the door to some protective
legislation. As soon as we saw that opportunity, we
immediately went to work developing legislation."
Kathryn Kolbert, who works with Benshoof in the
newly formed Center for Reproductive Law &
Policy, agrees that states will become hotbeds of
activity. "After Webster, there were some 600 bills
introduced," she said. "I personally think I went to
22 states. And I think this year, frankly, will be one
of the worst."
Members of the antiabortion community protest
that state regulations are "protections" that should not
be resisted by women's advocates. They say women
are being exploited by the "billion-dollar abortion
industry" that wants to keep their business, and
abortion opponents especially advocate requiring
physicians to detail fetal development and make
women wait at least 24 hours before having an
abortion.
Abortion rights advocates say such laws are a
burden on poorer women in rural areas who must
drive long distances and stay overnight to obtain an
abortion. "Casey divides the country into women who
are rich and women who are poor," Benshoof said.
Sarah Weddington, the lawyer who defended the
"Jane Roe" in the landmark abortion case, added,
"The 24-hour waiting period comes into a new focus
... when you hear about a young woman who went
into a clinic and the [other side] copied down her
license plate and they called her parents that night
and created a real family ruckus."
Weddington, who was 27 when she heard she had
won the case, last year wrote a book about her
experience representing a young carnival worker who
claimed she was raped and wanted an abortion. (Rape
was not an issue in the legal challenge to the Texas
abortion ban, and the woman later disclosed that she
had not been raped.)
In the book, Weddington also described for the
first time her own abortion, as "a scared graduate
student in 1967 in a dirty, dusty Mexican border
town . . . fleeing the law that made abortion illegal
in Texas."
Political Jousting Over Restrictions
The jousting between the states and courts does not
mean that Congress can avoid this emotional issue.
In an attempt to roll back state restrictions and cut
off new regulation, abortion rights activists have
asked Congress to pass a bill that would significantly
limit state abortion laws and try to capture the
essence of Roe. The lead proponents are Rep. Don
Edwards (D-Calif.) and Sen. George J. Mitchell
(D-Maine).
Georgetown University law professor Louis
Michael Seidman, who was a law clerk to Justice
Thurgood Marshall in 1973, said, "The initial
decision in Roe was about the limits of government,
that the government ought not to intervene. What's
coming in the future is a movement that would have
government intervene to make the right to abortion
meaningful."
An example, Seidman said, is the effort to get the
federal government to disperse militant Operation
Rescue antiabortion protesters who blockade clinics.
The Supreme Court last week ruled that a
Reconstruction-era federal civil rights law could not
be used to stop the protesters, leaving state law
enforcement agencies to handle the activists who
handcuff themselves to doorways and otherwise use
their bodies to block access to clinics. A case is still
pending at the court that tests whether a federal
racketeering law could be used against the protesters.
Congress, foremost a political body, traditionally
has tried to avoid the abortion issue. The few
provisions adopted have been victories for abortion
opponents. Since 1976, Congress has barred the use
of Medicaid funds for most abortions, meaning that
unless a poor woman lives in a state that helps pay
for abortions, the procedure is not an option for her.
In the last Congress, the proposed Freedom of
Choice Act died in committees, abortion rights
supporters were unable to overturn the "gag rule"
prohibiting abortion counseling in publicly funded
305
clinics, and provisions that would have reversed a
Bush administration ban on funding research using
tissue from aborted fetuses also foundered.
"In Congress, it is slam-dunk time on the floor,"
when abortion comes up, said Rep. Bruce F. Vento
(D-Minn.).
Vento should know. For six years as a state
legislator and 15 years in Congress, Vento opposed
abortion but was ambivalent on whether the
government should adopt policies to stop it.
"The Roman Catholics backed me up," he said,
until many of those moderate Democrats left the
party in the late 1970s in opposition to abortion and
other controversial "liberal" issues. Then, the
remaining "Democratic pro-choicers were asking me
to justify every vote."
"I start getting in trouble from both sides for some
of my compromise positions. . . . Then comes the
Webster [decision, which allowed more legislative
restrictions]. It's 1989 and the court says this thing is
really coming our way."
Vento, a former altar boy and the second-oldest of
eight children in an Italian Catholic family, said it
was time to "put up or shut up."
His bottom line was written in a December 1991
letter to constituents: "A national government policy
[for] . . . abortion limits and conditions
would be unworkable and unfair."
In November, Vento was reelected with 58 percent
of the vote, about 10 percentage points less than he
had received in the previous two elections.
It is rare that abortion makes or breaks an election.
In a Gallup Poll before last November's elections,
only 13 percent of the respondents said abortion was
a deciding factor for them. Most of those people
oppose abortion, according to other polls.
Yet, abortion is always there in politics, lying in
wait. Even legislation that touches abortion only
tangentially - or not at all - has been derailed with
an abortion-related amendment. Conservative activists
use abortion as an effective club against Democrats,
invoking Democrats' tolerance of abortion and
homosexuality to complain about a lack of "family
values."
Despite the antagonism and passion that infuses the
debate, the rhetoric from some leaders has mellowed.
During last fall's campaign, Vice President Dan
Quayle, who was vocally opposed to abortion rights,
deliberately resisted advocating an abortion ban.
Qualye deflected questions about a ban, insisting the
issue was: "How are we going to handle the tragedy
of abortion?"
Also last year, New York Gov. Mario M. Cuomo
(D) called on both sides to reach a "common ground"
to try to reduce the number of abortions.
Cuomo, who backs abortion rights, said more
attention should be given to adoption and preached
sexual abstinence, education and contraception.
In an interview last fall with the Catholic News
Service, Clinton agreed, saying, "We should. . . try
to find ways that people who disagree over what the
law should be on abortion can work together and
reduce the number of abortions."
That might be the politically expedient route. After
two decades of heavy lobbying, militant protests and
expensive advertising campaigns, neither side in the
abortion battle has convinced the country that
abortion should be either outright illegal or an
unqualified right.
Some on the front lines are not talking compromise
at all.
George Weigel, president of the Ethics and Public
Policy Center, is troubled by what he called a blithe
acceptance of abortion: "No one really has to have an
abortion."
Across the trenches, Planned Parenthood general
counsel Eve Paul said, "Either a woman can get an
abortion or not. I don't see how abortion can ever be
compromised."
Staff researcher Barbara J. Saffir contributed to
this report.
Search for 'Common Ground'
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RULING SENDS ABORTION ISSUE BACK TO THE STREETS
U.S. SUPREME COURT by Steven F. Shatz
Copyright 1993 American Lawyer Newspapers Group, Inc.
Texas Lawyer
April 26, 1993
Anti- abortion activists scored a significant victory
in January when the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a
judgment enjoining Operation Rescue's blockades
of abortion clinics. In Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993), the
court held that federal courts could not use the
conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42
U.S.C. section 1985(3), to protect abortion clinics
from the deliberately illegal and often violent actions
of Operation Rescue.
The ruling effectively withdraws the federal
judiciary (said by Randall Terry, head of Operation
Rescue, to be the "most potent weapon" against his
organization) from the abortion -clinic battles. Bray
comes at a time when violence against clinics and
their personnel is on the increase - culminating in
February in the murder of Dr. David Gunn at a clinic
protest. That violence highlights the parallels
between the current abortion wars and the Klan
outrages of the Reconstruction era and underscores
the court's misconstruction of section 1985(3) in
Bray.
ATTACKING CONSPIRACY
The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, containing the
present-day section 1985(3), was enacted in response
to a wave of politically motivated violence then
sweeping the South, which state authorities had
proved unwilling or unable to prevent. Congress had
before it substantial evidence that the Klan and other
similar groups were engaged in a concerted campaign
- virtual guerrilla warfare - against Republicans and
those assumed to be Republicans ("Unionists,"
freedmen and Northerners) for the purpose of
overthrowing Reconstruction. There was evidence
that the Klan broke up Republican meetings, drove
Republican officeholders out of town, and shot people
who were suspected of voting the Republican ticket.
Section 1985(3) created a federal civil remedy
against people conspiring "for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any state or territory from
giving or securing to all persons within such state or
territory the equal protection of the laws."
Two aspects of the statute are significant. First,
unlike all four other Reconstruction-era civil rights
laws section 1985(3) was not enacted to protect the
rights of freedmen. Rather the statute, by its terms,
protects all persons and classes. Second, the statute
protects against two different kinds of deprivation:
deprivation of federally guaranteed rights ("privileges
and immunities") and deprivation of state-created
rights ("equal protection of the laws").
The statute thus expresses a principle of vital
importance: When the partisans of one side of a
divisive public issue resort to concerted unlawful
action to win their point, the threaten the democratic
process, and their otherwise local crimes require
federal response.
Largely as the result of an 1883 Supreme Court
decision holding the parallel criminal-conspiracy
section unconstitutional and a 1951 decision holding
that the statute did not react private conspiracies,
section 1985(3) lay moribund for the first 100 years
after its enactment.
Then, in 1971, the court reversed itself and
resurrected the section Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 the court recognized that the section was
meant to reach wholly private conspiracies, and it
held that black plaintiffs, who had been pulled from
their car and beaten because the assailants thought the
driver was civil rights worker, had stated a claim
under the statute.
Griffin was followed by a number other cases
brought under section 1985(3), including, in recent
years, least 11 cases against Operation Rescue.
THE ABORTION WARS
The abortion wars are the modem day equivalent
of the struggles over Reconstruction. As was true
then, the country today is deeply divided over a
political/social question. One side enjoys the
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protection of the federal Constitution. The other
side, unable to prevail in the battle through legal
political means, has resorted to mob action and
violence to defeat its opponents' exercise of their
rights.
In the Bray litigation, the district court had found
that Operation Rescue's "rescue" tactic involved
massing its members around family-planning and
abortion clinics to disrupt activities by trespassing on
clinic grounds and physically blockading the clinics,
defacing signs and destroying property.
Of course, the "rescue" is one of the milder tactics
of abortion opponents. Clinics also have been
firebombed and sprayed with noxious chemicals, and
doctors have been subject to threats, a kidnapping and
now a murder.
As was true of Klan attacks during Reconstruction,
local law enforcement agencies are either unable or
unwilling to protect clinic operations. For these
reasons, the district court determined that Operation
Rescue was violating both section 1985(3) and state
trespass and public-nuisance laws, and it issued an
injunction against further unlawful acts.
The case was originally argued in the Supreme
Court in the fall of 1991, but was put over for
reargument last year, presumably to permit Justice
Clarence Thomas to participate in the decision. His
vote proved decisive in what was essentially a 5-4
decision to reverse the district court. The Supreme
Court interpreted section 1985(3) not to apply to anti-
abortion protests. (Justice David Souter concurred
with the majority in reversal, but would have upheld
the injunction under a different clause of the section
if proper findings had been made.)
MISCONSTRUCTION
The misconstruction of section 1985(3) had begun
with the court's earlier precedents. In Griffin, the
court did two things: It interpreted the statute as
requiring proof of racial or otherwise class-based
animus," and it upheld the claim in that case on the
theory that the plaintiffs were deprived of rights
under the 13th Amendment or the right to travel.
In United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, 463
U.S. 825 (1983), in a 5-4 decision, the court relied
on the approach implied in Griffin. At issue were
attacks by residents of a "union town" on a company
employing non-union workers from outside the area.
The court first examined whether the attacks were
made upon a "protected class" and held that
"economic" classes were not protected by the statute.
It then added, by way of dictum, that the non-union
workers had also failed to allege deprivation of a
federal right guaranteed against private action (like
the rights mentioned in Griffin).
Forced by the Griffin/Carpenters approach to
analyze Bray as a discrimination case and to
identify a protected class against whom Operation
Rescue held an animus, the district court (and later
the Supreme Court) assumed that the relevant class
was women. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
majority, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, and
the dissenters (Justices John Paul Stevens, Harry
Blackmun and Sandra Day O'Connor) debated
whether the defendants' hostility to abortion
amounted to animus against women.
Leaving open the question of whether women are
even a protected class under the statute, Justice Scalia
held that no animus against women had been proved.
Relying on 14th Amendment sex-discrimination
cases, he determined that the clinics were obliged to
prove that the defendants had intended to discriminate
against women. Because he found that there were
rational reasons for opposing abortion unrelated to
any intent with regard to women as a class, the
defendants' hostility to abortion did not establish an
intent to discriminate against women.
The holding that there was no class-based animus
disposed of the case, but Justice Scalia went on to
give a second reason for reversal. He held that the
statute requires proof that the defendants intended to
deprive the class of a right protected against private
impairment. He found no evidence in Bray of an
intent to interfere with the class' right to travel
because the defendants had no intent to discriminate
against out-of-staters in their actions. In addition, he
found that although the right to travel is protected
against private impairment, the right to abortion is
not.
ANIMUS CONCEDED
On both issues, Justice Scalia's reasoning simply
missed the point. It should not have mattered
whether the defendants had an animus against
women. The defendants' conceded animus against
supporters of abortion and the defendants' actions
directed against those exercising, or facilitating the
exercise of, the right to abortion were closely
analogous to the Klan's animus toward Republicans
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and their actions.
Likewise, it should not have mattered that the
defendants did not intend to deprive the plaintiffs of
federal rights. The defendants intended to - and did
- deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of
state law when, like the Klan, they engaged in illegal
activities in such numbers and at such locations that
their victims could not obtain the protection of state
authorities.
In Bray, the Supreme Court appears to have
interpreted section 1985(3) so restrictively that it
probably could not even have been used against the
Klan in 1871.
New legislation has been introduced in Congress
that may solve the particular problem of abortion
clinics by creating a federal crime and federal civil
cause of action (with treble damages) for intentional
obstruction of access to medical facilities providing
reproductive services. But in the meantime, the
Supreme Court, which refused to turn the abortion
issue over to. the state legislatures in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992), has instead returned it to the
streets. As the killing of Dr. Gunn demonstrates, the
streets can be a dangerous place for supporters of
abortion rights.
Steven F. Shatz is the Philip and Muriel Barnett
professor of trial advocacy at the University of San
Francisco School of Law. Distributed by the
American Lawyer News Service
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JUSTICES AVOID ABORTION RULING COURT REFUSES
TO REINSTATE RESTRICTIVE LAW IN LOUISIANA
By Linda P. Campbell, Chicago Tribune.
Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company
Chicago Tribune
March 9, 1993, Tuesday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION
The Supreme Court made clear Monday that it
wants to stay out of the abortion debate for the time
being, refusing to reinstate a Louisiana law that made
most abortions criminal acts.
Lower federal courts in Louisiana had ruled the
law unconstitutional, and the justices, with no
recorded dissents, let those rulings stand.
It was the second time this term that the court has
declined to review a restrictive abortion law. In
November, it turned down an appeal over a Guam
law that was found unconstitutional.
The court's action indicates there is not enough
support among the justices for tinkering with last
term's decision in Planned Parenthood vs. Casey,
which reaffirmed the constitutional right to abortion
but allowed state restrictions during the later stages of
pregnancy if the regulations do not put an "undue
burden" on women seeking abortions.
In separate appeals, Louisiana Gov. Edwin
Edwards and New Orleans District Atty. Harry
Connick Sr. had asked the justices to order the lower
courts to determine whether the law could be
constitutional in some cases.
Louisiana officials also asked the court to
reconsider its 1973 ruling in Roe vs. Wade, which
said the Constitution protects the right to choose
abortion and made the procedure legal nationwide.
Despite urgings from the Bush administration and
other abortion opponents, the court reaffirmed Roe in
its Casey decision last June.
Lawyers for the parties challenging the Louisiana
law called the state's attempts to outlaw abortion a
"senseless and costly enterprise that jeopardizes
women's health and lives." The opponents also
argued that it made criminal several forms of birth
control that prevent an embryo from implanting in the
womb.
Louisiana was one of several states that rushed to
adopt laws after the Supreme Court in 1989
broadened state power to regulate abortion.
The Louisiana law made abortions criminal unless
they were performed to save the mother's life or, in
certain cases, the pregnancy resulted from rape or
incest. A rape or incest victim would have to report
the crime to police and have the procedure before the
13th week of pregnancy for abortion to be legal.
Doctors who violated the law could be imprisoned
from 1 to 10 years and fined up to $100,000.
The Louisiana Legislature passed the law in June
1991 over the veto of then-Gov. Buddy Roemer, but
a group of women, doctors and abortion clinics
challenged it in court before it went into effect.
U.S. District Judge Adrian Duplantier struck down
the law, and the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with that ruling on the grounds that the Casey
ruling upheld Roe vs. Wade.
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JUSTICES TO RULE ON RACKETEER LAW IN ABORTION FIGHT
CLINICS TRYING TO COMBAT BLOCKADES WITH '70 LAW;
LOWER COURTS ARE SPLIT
By LyleDenniston, Washington Bureau
Baltimore Morning Sun
June 15, 1993
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court set the
stage yesterday for a major ruling on abortion
clinics' long campaign to defend themselves against
violent blockades by using the heavy artillery of a
federal anti-rackets law.
Taking the suggestion of women's rights groups
with support of the Clinton administration, the court
agreed to decide whether the 1970 anti-racketeering
law aimed at organized crime - providing tripled
damage verdicts - applies to attempts by groups
such as Operation Rescue to shut down health
facilities that perform abortions. Lower courts are
split on the issue.
The outcome of the case is important to the clinics,
and to blockaders, because of the court's 6-3 decision
last fall stripping clinics of most of the protection of
federal civil rights law, including a key section used
repeatedly against anti-abortion demonstrators. That
was a sweeping victory for the blockaders.
Congress has been pondering bills to overturn that
ruling, but it is having difficulty drawing the
competing political factions together enough to move
such a proposal forward.
The 1970 anti-rackets law thus may be the only
legal weapon available for clinics in the federal
courts. They could still try to rely on state and local
laws against trespass, but those have done little to
stop the protests.
The new case, to be heard by the justices in the
fall with a final decision likely sometime next year,
arose in a series of legal challenges to the nationwide
anti-abortion crusade led by Operation Rescue.
A federal appeals court in Chicago, however,
ruled last June that clinics and women's rights groups
may not use the anti-rackets law to seek damages
against blockades.
That ruling conflicts with a decision in 1989 by a
different federal appeals court allowing clinics to rely
upon the same law.
The Supreme Court in 1989 had left the decision
intact without reviewing it. That, however, was
before the lower courts divided on the issue.
The law, which is formally named the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, was
passed by Congress originally as an attack on mob
infiltration of legitimate businesses. It attacks
"enterprises" that engage in a "pattern of
racketeering." Among the remedies is a tripling of
the damages awarded for harms done.
In the years since 1970, the so-called RICO law
has been interpreted broadly by federal courts to
apply to a wide variety of economic wrongs on the
part of businesses.
In the ruling that the Supreme Court will be
reviewing, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
declared that the RICO law could be used against
those who blockade a clinic only if they had an
economic motive for their actions.
The Circuit Court found no evidence of such a
motive for the actions of Operation Rescue and
concluded that their goal was to stop abortion as a
medical procedure, not as a means of interfering with
clinic business operations.
The National Organization for Women and two
abortion clinics took the case on to the Supreme
Court, and they recently picked up the Clinton
administration's support.
The appeal by NOW and the clinics asked the
court for "relief from a nationwide criminal
conspiracy of extremists who use unlawful and
violent methods to close clinics that perform
abortions and to prevent women from using the
services of those clinics."
The appeal cited a list of hundreds of acts of arson,
assaults, clinic invasions and trespasses, along with
the theft of the remains of 4,000 fetuses from a
laboratory in order to give those fetuses a "funeral."
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Those kinds of actions, the appeal argues, amount
to criminal extortion against the clinics and should
trigger the RICO remedy.
Targets of the damages lawsuit include some of the
leading groups and key figures in the anti-abortion
movement nationwide: Operation Rescue and its
leader, Randall A. Terry of Windsor, N.Y., and the
Pro-life Action League and its leader, Joseph M.
Scheidler of Chicago. Mr. Scheidler has written a
manual on shutting down abortion clinics.
OTHER SUPREME COURT ACTIONS
The Supreme Court took these actions in opinions
and orders yesterday:
FINAL DECISION
Affirmative action: The court ruled 7-2 that a trade
group of businesses may go to federal court to
challenge the constitutionality of a local government's
"affirmative action" program setting aside some
parts of public works projects for minority-owned
companies to perform. To get into court, the trade
group only needs to show that its members cannot
compete equally for the government contracts.
The case involved a Jacksonville, Fla., ordinance.
CASE TO BE HEARD Gift tax: The court
agreed to rule at its term starting in October on a
major tax dispute that the federal government
says may affect the collection of many millions
of dollars in gift taxes. A Minnesota case tests
whether gift taxes must be paid on transfers of the
right to collect income from a trust set up before
that tax was enacted in 1932. The case involves a
family trust set up in 1917 by a wealthy St. Paul
investor, Lucius P. Ordway, who rescued the
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. (3M) when
it was deeply troubled financially in its early years.
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92-780 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
WOMEN INC. v. SCHEIDLER
Abortion-Federal relief from campaign to close
clinics-Sherman Act-RICO.
Ruling below (CA 7, 968 F2d 612, 61 LW
2037):
Anti-abortion groups' alleged conspiracy to
close abortion clinics does not involve exercise of
market control of supply of abortion services,
control of price, or discrimination between would-
be purchasers, and thus is not actionable under
Sherman Act, anti-abortion groups' illegal activi-
ties designed to close abortion clinics are not
proximate cause of their supporters' voluntary
contributions, nor is groups' enterprise operated
for economic motive, and thus their activities are
not actionable under Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.
Question presented: In addition to statutory
"interstate commerce" and injury to one's "busi-
ness or property" requirements of RICO, should
statute be further limited to cases in which either
enterprise or predicate acts has an overriding
economic motive?
Petition for certiorari filed 11/2/92, by Fay
Clayton, Susan Valentine, Robinson Curley &
Clayton P.C., Lowell E. Sachnoff, Jack L. Block,
Judi A. Lamble, and Sachnoff & Weaver Ltd.,
all of Chicago, Ill., and Alan M. Pollack, and
Pollack & Greene, both of New York, N.Y.
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NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER
No. 91-2468
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
968 F.2d 612; 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14865;
1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P69,884
February 19, 1992, Argued
June 29, 1992, Decided
BAUER, Chief Judge.
The plaintiffs, the National Organization for
Women, Inc. ("NOW"), the Delaware Women's
Health Organization, Inc. ("DWHO"), and Summit
Women's Health Organization, Inc. ("SWHO"),
brought this action seeking federal relief from the
defendants' nationwide campaign to close medical
clinics that provide abortion services. The second
amended complaint2 alleges violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. @ 1, and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C. @@ 1962(a), (c), and (d) ("RICO"). The
complaint also raises several pendent state claims.
The district court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 765
F. Supp. 937, 945 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
The plaintiffs appealed. We reluctantly affirm the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for two reasons.
First, we find that the antitrust laws were not
intended to apply to the defendants' activities.
Second, we hold that RICO requires either an
economically motivated enterprise or economically
motivated predicate acts.
I. Factual Background
The plaintiffs (a national non-profit organization
aimed at advancing and protecting women's rights,
and two women's health centers'), claim that the
defendants, anti-abortion activists, anti-abortion
groups, and a medical testing laboratory, engaged in
a conspiracy to close all women's health centers
providing abortions through a pattern of illegal
activity. The complaint alleged that the defendants
(other than Vital-Med Laboratories) engaged in the
following illegal" activities in order to close women's
health centers that perform abortions: extortion;
physical and verbal intimidation and threats directed
at health center personnel and patients; trespass upon
and damage to center property; blockades of centers;
destruction of center advertising; telephone campaigns
designed to tie up center phone lines; false
appointments to prevent legitimate patients from
making them; and direct interference with centers'
business relationships with landlords, patients,
personnel, and medical laboratories. Many of these
activities were organized by a coalition of
anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action
Network ("PLAN"). The defendants who have
participated in PLAN activities, the "PLAN
defendants" are Scheidler, Ryan, Terry, Scholberg,
Murphy, Wojnar, Migliorino, Pro-Life Action
League ("PLAL"), Pro-Life Direct Action League
("PDAL"), Operation Rescue ("OR"), and Project
Life.
More specifically, the complaint alleges that
defendant Scheidler distributes Closed: 99 Ways to
Stop Abortion, a manual which advocates unlawful
methods of interfering with the operations of
women's health centers. Employing the methods
detailed in the manual, defendants Scheidler, Ryan,
Terry, Scholberg, Murphy, and Migliorino have
spearheaded actions throughout the country aimed at
closing health centers. For example, in March 1986,
Scheidler, Ryan, PLAL, and PDAL, led others
(alleged to be their co-conspirators) in an invasion of
a health center in Florida. Protestors entered the
center, and injured the center's administrator and
another woman, the medical procedures room was
ransacked, and medical supplies were destroyed. The
participants who stormed the center were convicted
on criminal charges.
Other demonstrations organized by defendants
involved hundreds of individuals who blockaded
clinics. During these "blitzes," as they are called,
defendants' groups, using a method called "lock and
block, " pour glue into clinic locks, and individual
protestors lock themselves to clinic doors. Another
tactic involves abrasive confrontations with women
seeking abortions, designed, according to a news
release prepared by defendants, to take away the
centers' business. The complaint details many other
invasions of clinics, and in one case, a judge's home,
involving injuries, trespass, and vandalism. Often
these demonstrations resulted in the arrests of
hundreds of demonstrators, including defendants, for
state criminal law violations. For example, defendant
Ryan has been arrested more than three hundred
times; defendant Scheidler has been convicted and
fined for criminal trespass and harassment. We note
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that the complaint does not purport to catalog all of
the defendants' arrests and criminal convictions.
The plaintiffs also allege that two of the defendants
(Wojnar and Terry) have established competing
pregnancy testing and counseling facilities.
Defendant Vital-Med Laboratories, an Illinois
corporation, provided pathology testing and safe,
sanitary disposal services to DWHO, SWHO, and
other affiliated clinics. Plaintiffs allege that Vital-Med
participated in a conspiracy to steal fetal remains
from Vital-Med's Northbrook, Illinois laboratory. In
January 1988, defendant Wojnar was contacted by a
Vital-Med employee who detailed a scheme for
stealing fetal remains from the laboratory. Over a
ten-month period, in conspiracy with one or more
Vital-Med employees, defendants Murphy and
Migliorino stole approximately 4,000 aborted fetuses
from the laboratory. Murphy and Migliorino each
entered Vital-Med's Northbrook laboratory, opened
sealed storage drums containing a variety of medical
waste, and removed fetal specimens. On at least one
occasion, an entire storage drum was stolen.
Vital-Med employees, who saw Murphy and
Migliorino on at least one occasion, did nothing to
stop the thefts.
The remains were stored at the homes of Scheidler,
Murphy, Migliorino, and Wojnar. Scheidler kept the
storage drum in a playhouse in his backyard for
several weeks. After the fetal remains were removed,
Murphy dumped the drum containing the remaining
medical waste in a dumpster in Chicago. Remains
were sent to anti-abortion activists in Indiana, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Delaware, and Florida.
Activists eventually held mass burial services for the
fetuses in several states. Scheidler announced to news
media that the fetuses had been found at a Chicago
laboratory and that they were "individually packaged
and labelled . . . with the names of the mothers,
doctors, dates and places the abortions were
performed." Second Amended Complaint, R. 236 at
24. Vital-Med no longer accepts fetal remains for
testing.
Finally, defendants contacted businesses that
provide goods and services to health centers and
threatened to disrupt and harass them if they
continued to transact business with the centers. When
SWHO arranged a move to new premises, defendant
Migliorino threatened SWHO's future landlord and
co-tenants. The landlord terminated the lease.
We note here that the complaint does not attempt
to bar all anti-abortion activities. Peaceful picketing,
debate, meetings, prayers, and a host of other forms
of peaceful protest, are protected by the First
Amendment. The complaint seeks relief from
criminal and tortious activities such as trespass, clinic
invasion, vandalism, extortion, and tortious
interference with business relationships.
Moreover, the complaint does not allege that the
defendants have attempted to influence any
governmental actor. There is no allegation that
defendants petitioned a court, an administrative
agency, an executive officer, or a legislature.
Therefore, the district court's conclusion that the
defendants' primary objective was to influence
legislation is in error. Although the defendants' acts
generated publicity which they may have hoped
would influence governmental actors, this tangential
contact is not sufficient to invoke First Amendment
protection for otherwise criminal behavior. See
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Inc., 458 U.S. 886,
916 (1981).
IV. RICO
The Plaintiffs have also claimed that defendants
Scheidler, Terry, Scholberg, Murphy, PLAL,
Operation Rescue, and Project Life have violated the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C. @@ 1962(a),(c),(d).
A. @ 1962(a)
The plaintiffs alleged in count two of the complaint
that PLAN, PLAL, and Operation Rescue violated @
1962(a)' 4 because the donations they receive from
supporters are derived from their racketeering
activity. The racketeering activity is extortion under
the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. @ 1951, directed at health
centers, center employees, and patients. Plaintiffs
asserted that "it is well-known that the more
outrageous and highly publicized the activities are,
the more likely the RICO Defendants and the
enterprises are to receive larger donations." RICO
Case Statement, R. 469, at 22.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
under @ 1962(a) because it found that the income
defendants receive through donations was not
"derived directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity." 765 F. Supp. at 941. Because
contributors were not extorted, the court held that the
contributions were not derived from racketeering
activities.
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In reaching its holding, the district court relied
heavily upon Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688 (7th
Cir. 1987). In Hemmings, the defendant agreed to
purchase the plaintiffs company for a cash
downpayment, plus five subsequent cash payments
and other consideration. Id. at 692. The plaintiff
[*6241 alleged that the defendant never intended to
make the subsequent payments, and instead used the
money to buy a second corporation. The plaintiff
argued that the defendant violated @ 1962(a) because
the money saved by failing to make payments was
"derived from a pattern of racketeering activity." Id.
We refused to accept this argument-we found that
although the defendant may have used income he
owed plaintiff to fund his second business, there was
no suggestion that that income came from fraud. Id.
The source of the misapplied income was "proper and
aboveboard. The fraud was in promising to pay
Hemmings the balance of the agreed purchase price
. when Barian had no intention of ever paying
it." Id. Because the money was lawful income, not
extracted from the plaintiff (or anyone else) by fraud,
we refused to find a RICO violation.
Plaintiffs argue that Hemmings does not support
the district court's holding because "in Hemmings,
the defendant did not 'derive' the money from
anything illegal-he already had it. Here, the
defendants had the money only after their
well-publicized, unlawful acts prompted their
supporters to send them the money .
Appellants' Brief at 48. This argument is
unpersuasive. The plaintiffs argue based upon their
reading of Azurite Corp. v. Amster & Co., 730 F.
Supp. 571, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), that the Hemmings
claim was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to
plead a causal connection between the fraud and the
income invested. Based on this reading, plaintiffs
argue that Hemmings does not dictate the dismissal of
their claim under @ 1962(a) because they pleaded a
connection. I5
Plaintiffs attempt to bolster this argument with
references to United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184,
1194 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 759 (1991),
and United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 628
(7th Cir. 1980). These cases are unavailing. In Vogt,
the defendant, a customs officer, laundered bribe
money through a group of dummy corporations that
deposited money off-shore, brought it back into the
United States, and then invested it. Vogt argued that
the government failed to prove he invested the bribe
money in the laundering enterprises. The court stated
that "section 1962(a) does not exact rigorous proof of
the exact course of income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity into its 'ultimate use or
investment.'" Id. at 1194.
Plaintiffs point to this language in support of their
contention that they adequately have alleged that the
donations defendants receive are "derived" from their
racketeering acts. This argument is specious-the
Fourth Circuit was dismissing the argument that the
government in its proof, must trace illegally received
money "from its receipt to its ultimately proscribed
'use or investment' by the defendant." Id. In other
words, plaintiffs in this case are not required to show
the specific flow of contributions from the time the
defendants receive them until they ultimately spend
them. There was no question that Vogt derived
income from racketeering-he took bribes.
McNary is analogous. McNary, as Mayor of
Lansing, Illinois, was convicted of bribery and
extortion. The issue on appeal was whether the
government proved that McNary invested the $
85,000 in bribery receipts in his family-owned travel
company. We noted that the statute does not require
"immediate or even direct use of illicit income to
establish a violation of its terms. . . . To require . .
. that the evidence show a direct employment of illicit
income is to ignore the clear proscription of the
statute . . ." McNary, 620 F.2d at 628. Plaintiffs
again misapprehend this language. See Appellants'
Brief at 49. In McNary we held that interim deposits,
commingled funds, and other accounting techniques
do not bar liability. Section 1962(a) does not require
the government to trace the course of each penny of
illicit income through the defendant's hands.
McNary, 620 F.2d at 629.
Thus the cases the plaintiffs cite are inapposite to
their claim--at issue here is whether the defendants'
contributions were derived from their extortionate
acts. We agree with the district court that they were
not. Plaintiffs concede that the contributions are only
"indirect" income from the extortionate acts, but they
argue this is sufficient under @ 1962(a). That section
does sanction the use of funds "derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity."
The attenuated causal connection between the
defendants' criminal trespass, threats, and vandalism,
and their receipt of donations from third parties,
however, is not sufficient.
The Supreme Court has noted that notions of
proximate cause are properly applied to RICO.
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112
S. Ct. 1311 (1992). In Holmes, the Court held that
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an insurance company could not recover under @
1962 based upon the defendants' fraud on its insured
and its insured's customers. Id. Proximate cause
generally is associated with the determination in civil
tort litigation as to whether the plaintiffs injury was
direct enough to permit him to recover from the
defendant. Id. at 1318. Nevertheless, we believe this
judicial tool for examining the directness of a
relationship is helpful in this context. "At bottom, the
notion of proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what
justice demands, or of what is administratively
possible and convenient.'" Id. (quoting W. Keeton,
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Own, Prosser and
Keeton on Law of Torts @ 41, p. 264 (5th ed.
1984)). The cause and effect chain plaintiffs posit is
something like this: defendants invade health centers,
destroying property and injuring center staff; media
covers event; potential contributors see media
coverage and are favorably impressed; contributor
sends donation; defendants receive income. Based in
part upon notions of proximate cause, we believe this
alleged relationship between the defendants' criminal
acts and their supporters voluntary contributions is
simply too tenuous to satisfy the requirements of @
1962(a).
We also find the cases interpreting the RICO
forfeiture provisions of @ 1963 support our
conclusion. Section 1963(a)(1) requires that a
defendant forfeit "any interest he has acquired or
maintained in violation of @ 1962 . . . ." In
interpreting the term "interest" under this section, we
have held that "the court must determine what portion
of [the defendant's] interests would not have been
acquired or maintained 'but for' his racketeering
activities. United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235,
1243 (7th Cir. 1987).
Following this reasoning, under @ 1962(a),
"income derived, directly or indirectly, from a
pattern of racketeering activity" is only income that
the defendants would not have received 'but for' their
racketeering conduct. Here, plaintiffs have not
alleged that contributors would not have donated
money to the defendants but for the defendant's
predicate racketeering acts. Therefore, the income is
not derived from racketeering activity for purposes of
@ 1962(a).
B. @ 1962(c)
In count three, plaintiffs allege that Pro-Life Action
Network ("PLAN") operated as an enterprise in
violation of @ 1962(c). PLAN is a coalition of
anti-abortion groups. The defendants who have
participated in PLAN activities, the "PLAN
defendants," are Scheidler, Ryan, Terry, Scholberg,
Murphy, Wojnar, Migliorino, Pro-Life Action
League ("PLAL"), Pro-Life Direct Action League
("PDAL"), Operation Rescue ("OR"), and Project
Life.
Section 1962(c) prohibits conduct of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity." See
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1985). The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' @
1962(c) claims because it found that @ 1962(c)
requires that plaintiffs allege "some profit-generating
purpose." Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, at 943. The
court read existing case law to require either the
predicate acts of racketeering or the enterprise to
have some financial motive. The plaintiffs argue that
only an economic effect on interstate commerce is
required, which they have alleged.
Whether or not liability under RICO may be
imposed when neither the enterprise nor the
racketeering acts are economically motivated is a
question of first impression in this circuit. The other
circuits are split on the issue. Compare United States
v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 1988) ("For
purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed
toward an economic goal."); United States v. Ivic,
700 F.2d 51, 59-65 (2d Cir. 1983)(same) with
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868
F.2d 1342, 1349-40 (3d Cir. 1989)(because predicate
offense (Hobbs Act) does not require economic
motive, RICO requires no additional economic
motive), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989); Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-1617,
1988 WL 156656, *11 n.2 (W.D. Wash., Mar. 11,
1988) (citing McMonagle and declining to follow
Ivic). In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in
McMonagle, Justice White noted the conflict.
Although we have never grappled with the
economic motive issue head on, we have adopted the
Eighth Circuit's definition of enterprise, which
includes an economic goal requirement. United States
v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir. 1986)
(quoting United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358,
1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986). Other
circuits have also adopted the Anderson formulation.
See United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 363
(D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d
152, 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
Section 1961(l)(4) states that an enterprise
"includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
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association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact though not a
legal entity." In this case, PLAN does not appear to
have legal status as a corporation, partnership, or
association recognized by state law. Rather, it is a
group that organizes anti-abortion activities. Hence,
it comes under the "group of individuals associated in
fact though not a legal entity" portion of @ 1961.
Anderson and Neapolitan provide the framework
for determining whether an informal association is an
enteprise. In Anderson, two court administrators were
charged with defrauding their employers through a
false purchase-order scheme. 626 F.2d at 1980. The
indictment alleged that each defendant's association
with the salesman who supplied the phony invoices
constituted the enterprise. Now, of course, the
government more routinely alleges that the entities
that employ such defendants are the enterprise. The
Anderson court found that the enterprise must
"signify an association that is substantially different
from the acts which form the pattern of racketeering
activity." Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1865. After a
thorough analysis of the statutory language, the court
held that the term enterprise encompasses only an
association having an ascertainable structure which
exists for the purpose of maintaining operations
directed toward an economic goal that has an
existence that can be defined apart from the
commission of the predicate acts constituting the
pattern of racketeering activity.
Id. at 1372.
We adopted this holding in Neapolitan, where we
too distinguished between the raoketeering acts and
the enterprise. 791 F.2d at 500. Neapolitan
considered the enterprise in two RICO cases
involving a stolen car ring. In one, police officers
took bribes from car thieves, and were charged with
conducting the sheriff's office (the enterprise) through
a pattern of racketeering activity. In the other, the car
thieves themselves operated a large scale "chop
shop," which was allegedly the RICO enterprise.
As plaintiffs point out, economic motive was not
an issue in either Neapolitan or Anderson. It was
clear defendants were acting for financial gain.
Another case adopting Anderson, United States v.
Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1980), did place
some emphasis on the profit motive. Errico involved
a conspiracy to fix horse races. The court found that
a circle of betters and jockeys, joined together
through the defendant, satisfied the enterprise
requirement because they regularly attempted to and
did profit from the illegally fixed races. Id. at 156.
The lack of significant focus on motive weakens
the authority of these cases somewhat on this
particular issue, however, so we turn to the cases that
have confronted it directly. The leading case, United
States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983), involved
a Croatian nationalist group that used "terror,
assassination, bombings, and violence in order to
foster and promote their beliefs and in order to
eradicate and injure persons whom they perceived as
in opposition to their beliefs." Id. at 58.
In a carefully reasoned opinion, the court in Ivic
drew upon the language of the statute, its legislative
history, Supreme Court precedent, and Justice
Department Guidelines to determine that the
enterprise or predicate acts must have an economic
motive to violate RICO.
Reading 1962(c) together with sections (a) and (b),
the Ivic court stated that the term enterprise in those
sections referred to "an organized profit-seeking
venture." Id. at 60. It noted there was no indication
that Congress intended to have the same term mean
something different in section (c). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has stated that "We should not lightly
infer that Congress intended [terms] to have wholly
different meanings in neighboring subsections."
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489
(1984). The court examined the legislative history of
the Act, and explained that the terrorist actions were
not part of the "evil corruption of our commerce and
trade" which the Act was intended to remedy. Ivic,
700 F.2d at 63 (quoting 116 Cong. Rec. 35295,
remarks of Representative Poff).
The Ivic court observed that although United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), held that the term
enterprise encompasses illegitimate organizations, it
did not suggest the term reaches every such
organization. Turkette recognized that RICO was
originally directed at the infiltration of organized
crime into legitimate business with funds raised
through loan sharking, illegal gambling, and other
criminal activities. Id. (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at
591 (1981)). The Ivic court found that political
terrorist organizations do not generate funds that
could allow them to infiltrate legitimate business. Id.
This court has noted that although infiltration by
organized crime was the major concern of Congress,
those concerns extended much further. Horoco v.
American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,
747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Turkette, 452
U.S. at 590-91), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). In fact
the Supreme Court has noted that "although [RICO]
had organized crime as its focus, [it] was not limited
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in application to organized crime." H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248
(1989). Nevertheless, we believe congressional
concerns may not have extended so far as the
activities of political terrorists which involve neither
economic crimes nor economic motivations.
The Ivic court also stated that the Justice
Department's 1981 RICO Guidelines provided that a
RICO indictment should not charge an association as
an enterprise, unless the association exists "for the
purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an
economic goal . . . ." Id. at 64. Based on these
factors, the Ivic court held that an indictment that
fails to charge that the enterprise or predicate acts
had an economic motive does not state a crime under
@ 1962(c).
The Second Circuit returned to the issue in United
States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983). Bagaric also involved
a Croatian terrorist group, but the defendants also
"perpetrated an extensive international extortion
scheme using the United States and foreign mails."
Id. at 46. The group, in addition to bombing, arson
and murder, established a scheme to extort money
from moderate Croatians in the United States to
support their activities. Id. at 48. The group compiled
a list of "potential wealthy victims, and threatened to
squeeze [them] financially . . ." Id. Extortion letters
demanding $ 5,000 to $ 20,000 were posted from
foreign countries directed victims to mail money to a
post office box in Paraguay. Several individuals who
resisted the extortion demands were killed. 706 F.2d
at 50.
The court held that because some of the predicate
acts were economically motivated, i.e. extorting
money to finance terrorist activities, RICO's
economic motivation requirement was satisfied. It
pointed out that Ivic did not require that economic
gain be the sole motive of every RICO violation. Id.
at 53. Ivic only required that either the predicate acts
or the enterprise be geared toward economic gain.
Political motivations would not shield the "more than
fifty acts of the classic economic crime of extortion
. . . ." simply because the money would be used for
political ends. Id. at 58. Thus Bagaric rearmed Ivic's
holding that the government (or a civil plaintiff) may
show financial purpose through either the enterprise
or the predicate racketeering acts. Id. at 56.
The Second Circuit revisited the issue again in
United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985). Ferguson
involved bank and armored-truck robberies, and
murders performed to support the Black Liberation
Army. The defendants challenged their indictment
under RICO because they were "revolutionaries." Id.
at 853. The court explained, however, that RICO
requires only "some financial purpose." Id. The
defendants were charged with ten robberies and
attempted robberies, and the murders of police and
guards committed during the course of the robberies.
The money obtained from the crimes was used to
support the "revolutionary" enterprise. Because the
defendants' activities were centered around the
commission of economic crimes, the court held that
RICO was properly applied to the defendants. Id.
Shortly after Ferguson was decided, the Supreme
Court rejected the Second Circuit's interpretation of
@ 1962(c), which barred civil actions unless the
defendant had been convicted of criminal charges and
the plaintiff could show "racketeering injury."
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1985). Plaintiffs in this case argue that Sedima
prohibits any limitation on the scope of RICO.
Appellants' Brief at 37. We disagree. This court, in
Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co.
of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473
U.S. 606 (1985), rejected the racketeering injury
requirement, and held that injuries caused by the
predicate acts of racketeering satisfy RICO. Id. at
388. We noted with some concern the Second
Circuit's attempts to limit RICO to organized crime
activities, and rejected that limitation.
Although we have resisted attempts to limit the
scope of civil RICO, we do not believe the limitation
imposed by the Ivic, Bagaric, Ferguson, line of cases
is unwarranted. We recognize that "even if Congress
did not anticipate all of the consequences of RICO,
the breadth of the statute, including the civil
provisions, was the result of deliberate policy choices
on the part of Congress." Haroco, 747 F.2d at
398-99. But, as the Second Circuit discussed in Ivic,
we believe the use of the term enterprise in @@
1962(a) and (b) conveys a restriction to economic
entities. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 61.
This court has also looked to the provisions of @
1962(a) to guide our interpretation of @ 1962(c),
albeit on a different point. See Haroco, 747 F.2d at
402 (interpreting interaction of roles of "enterprise"
and "person"). The courts have extended the
economic motivation limitation by allowing
economically motivated predicate acts to bring
conduct within the scope of RICO. Further expansion
does not seem justified. "We do not think the general
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principle of liberal interpretation of RICO can be
used to stretch section 1962(c) to reach this situation
in the face of the subsection's own limits." Haroco,
747 F.2d at 400.
Further, the Court in Sedima seemed particularly
troubled by the vague, amorphous nature of the
racketeering injury requirement. Sedima, 473 U.S. at
494-95. The economic motive requirement does not
have this weakness. Moreover, the Court held that
the statute requires only that the plaintiff allege each
element of the violation, and that courts should not
graft on additional elements. Id. at 497. In this case
we do not believe we are adding elements to the
offense, but merely fleshing out the definitions of
those elements.
Further, despite its urging to avoid undue
limitations of civil RICO, the Court has referred
consistently to "businesses":
Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and
'illegitimate' enterprises. Legitimate businesses enjoy
neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor
immunity from its consequences; and, as a result, @
1962(c)'s use against respected businesses allegedly
engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal
conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that
the provision is being misconstrued.
Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 229. This emphasis
on business--economic activity--bolsters our
conclusion that non-economic crimes committed in
furtherance of non-economic motives are not within
the ambit of RICO. We also find support in the
economic motive requirement discussed in Anderson,
Neapolitan, and Flynn, supra.
We do not believe that requiring an economic
motive will place undue limitations upon RICO
actions. Nor do we believe our holding flies in the
face of the Supreme Court's dictates in Sedima and
Northwestern Bell. Indeed, we find that this
interpretation of @ 1962(c) is dictated by the terms of
the statute. Thus, although we agree with the Third
Circuit's interpretation of the Hobbs Act," we
decline to follow its holding that, in these
circumstances involving a non-economic enterprise
committing non-economic predicate acts, plaintiffs
may invoke the provisions of RICO. McMonagle,
868 F.2d at 1349-50.
The plaintiffs argue that, even if there is an
economic motive requirement, they have alleged that
the defendants committed unlawful acts to raise
funds. More specifically that the defendants received
contributions as a result of their extortionate acts and,
that they sold materials detailing unlawful methods of
closing health centers. The plaintiffs argue that it is
reasonable to infer from these allegations that the
defendants committed extortionate acts to raise funds.
In addition, they contend that defendants' activities
were economically motivated because they were
aimed at increasing the plaintiffs' costs of doing
business. Increasing their costs, plaintiffs argue,
satisfies the economic purpose requirement. Finally,
plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to prove that the
defendants intended to generate financial gain by
selling materials advocating criminal acts against the
centers.
There are several problems with these contentions.
First, it is not reasonable to infer that the purpose of
the defendants' extortion is to raise funds. It is clear
that the aim of the extortion is to close women's
health centers, as plaintiffs have repeatedly alleged
throughout their complaint. That reprehensible
criminal and tortious conduct results incidentally in
donations to support it, is more a comment on the
nature of the defendants' supporters than on the
purpose of the defendants' acts.
Second, none of the cases discussing an economic
motive requirement adopt the plaintiffs' theory that
raising the victim's costs satisfies the requirement. In
fact, Ivic itself seems to contradict such an
interpretation. In Ivic, victims' businesses were
threatened with arson and bombing. Certainly this
would increase their "costs," although the defendants'
motive in that case was political coercion unrelated to
the operation of the businesses. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 58.
The plaintiffs' argument seems to be a vestige of the
"raising rivals' costs" argument raised in their
anti-trust claim. We do not contest that the
defendants' activities had an economic effect on the
plaintiffs, we simply refuse to equate that effect with
the economic motive required by Ivic and its
progeny.
Finally, selling materials advocating a particular
viewpoint, even if the materials advocate illegal
actions, is not a predicate racketeering [**621
activity. Therefore income derived from the sales is
not income derived from racketeering activity.
Moreover, unless the materials violate the "clear and
present danger" test, their distribution is protected by
the First Amendment. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 308 (1939):
No one would have the hardihood to suggest that
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the principle of freedom of speech sanctions
incitement to riot or that religious liberty connotes the
privilege to exhort others to physical attack upon
those belonging to another sect. When clear and
present danger of riot, disorder, . . . or other
immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order,
appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish
is obvious.
For these reasons, we find no merit in the
plaintiffs' argument that they have satisfied the
economic motive requirement of @ 1962(c). C.@
1962(d)
Under count four, plaintiffs charge that PLAN,
PLAL, and Operation Rescue conspired to violate
sections 1962(a) and (c), an offense punishable by @
1962(d). Because plaintiffs claims under sections
1962(a) and (c) fail, we find no violation of @
1962(d).
V.
In conclusion, despite the reprehensible nature of
the defendants' activities, we find that they are not
within the reach of the Sherman Act or RICO.
Therefore, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
ENDNOTES
2. For purposes of simplicity, we shall refer to
the second amended complaint (Record Document
236) in text as "the complaint."
3. NOW sought class certification for itself, its
women members who use or may use the targeted
health centers, and other women who use or may use
the services of such centers. The health-center
plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly-situated centers performing abortions. The
district court did not certify either class, apparently
deferring its ruling until resolution of the motions to
dismiss. See Minute Order of 1/08/88. All pending
motions were dismissed as moot when the court
granted defendants' motion to dismiss. See National
Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp.
937, 945 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
4. When we use the terms illegal and unlawful
to describe the defendants' activities, we refer not to
violations of RICO or the antitrust laws, but to acts
that are otherwise unlawful, such as trespass and
vandalism.
5. The district court also found that the
defendants, in particular Scheidler, have links with
arsonists who have fire-bombed health centers. The
court also found that the defendants have not
condemned fire-bombing. The court made these
findings after defendant Wojnar moved for Rule 11
sanctions based upon the plaintiffs' allegation of the
association in a pleading. See Denial of Defendant
Wojnar's First Motion for Sanctions, March 27,
1992.
14. 18 U.S.C. @ 1962(a) provides in relevant
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received
any in come derived, directly or indirectly, from a
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has
participated as a principal . . . to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect interstate commerce.
15. Azurite held that defendants who were able
to purchase stock at artificially low prices because of
their fraudulent SEC filings derived income from the
fraud within the meaning of @ 1962(a).
16. @ 1962(c) provides: It shall be unlawful
for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
17. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. @ 1951, which
punishes obstruction of interstate commerce through
extortionate means, does not require that the
defendant profit economically from the extortion. See
Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915
F.2d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983) (defendant
kidnapped and threatened to kill physician unless he
agreed to cease performing abortions violated Act);
United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975)
("solicitations" for religious purposes not exempt
from Hobbs Act).
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Court Lets North Dakota Enforce Abortion Law:
Limits, Modeled on Pennsylvania Statute, Require Counseling and 24-Hour Wait
By Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
Copyright 1993 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
April 3, 1993, Saturday, Final Edition
The Supreme Court yesterday refused to stop
North Dakota officials from enforcing a law requiring
women to receive counseling and wait 24 hours
before obtaining an abortion.
By a 7 to 2 vote, the court rejected a request by
the state's only abortion clinic to stop the law from
taking effect while it is being challenged in the lower
courts. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul
Stevens dissented.
At the same time, a statement in the case by two
other justices signaled that the federal courts may
have to give greater scrutiny to abortion restrictions
imposed by states in the future, reviewing each one
on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis to see if it
creates an "undue burden" on a woman's right to end
her pregnancy.
The approach could make it harder for states
simply to adopt regulations that have been upheld in
another state. For example, in states where women
must travel long distances to an abortion clinic, a
waiting period might require a woman to find
overnight accommodations, miss an extra day of
work and, in the court's view, be more onerous.
In a statement concurring with yesterday's action,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote, "[A] law
restricting abortions constitutes an undue burden, and
hence is invalid, if in a large fraction of the cases in
which the law is relevant, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo
an abortion."
She was joined by David H. Souter in the order in
Fargo Womens' Health Organization v. Schafer.
They wrote separately specifically to reject an
approach by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th
Circuit that would require parties challenging an
abortion statute to show that it would be
unconstitutional in all circumstances.
The overriding issue is how far states may go in
regulating the abortion right and how much they
ultimately may infringe on Roe v. Wade, the 1973
ruling that made abortion legal nationwide.
The Supreme Court in a 1992 Pennsylvania case
lowered the standards of Roe and permitted abortion
restrictions that earlier had been struck down under
Roe. Since that ruling in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, lower courts
have struggled to interpret its new test that women
must not face an "undue burden" in exercising their
right to end a pregnancy.
Because the court permitted Pennsylvania's
requirement that women be counseled on fetal
development and alternatives to abortion and wait 24
hours, other states, including North Dakota, have
tried to enforce similar laws.
Scott Heller, a senior attorney at the Center for
Reproductive Law & Policy, which challenged the
North Dakota statute as unconstitutional, said, "We
now know that there are at least four justices who
believe that under Casey a factual assessment of
abortion restrictions are [sic] required," referring to
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter. "Once
Justice [Byron R.] White retires, we are likely to get
a fifth justice to take the same position."
However, Carol Long, political action director of
the National Right to Life Committee, said it is
impossible to predict how the court would rule on the
merits of any regulation.
The court has not sent clear signals. Last
December it refused to review a Mississippi case
involving a waiting period law. Abortion rights
advocates contended that rural Mississippi women,
relatively poorer than their Pennsylvania counterparts,
faced a greater "burden" under the law.
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Leeway Seen in Ruling on Abortion Protests
DEBORAH PINES
Copyright 1993 New York Law Publishing Company
New York Law Journal
April 22, 1993, Thursday
A U.S. SUPREME COURT ruling in January on
abortion clinic blockades restricts, but does not
preclude altogether, the use of a Reconstruction-era
civil rights law to enjoin such blockades, a federal
appeals panel in Manhattan ruled yesterday.
In what is believed the only circuit court to make
such a ruling, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit warned against
reading Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
, 113 S.Ct. 753, too broadly. The warning came in
lifting, for now, a permanent injunction against anti-
abortion protesters at a West Hartford women's
clinic, in Town of West Hartford v. Operation
Rescue, 92-7595.
"To the extent that appellants are contending that
Bray forecloses all resort to @1985(3) (knowing as
the Ku Klux Klan Act) in all instances involving
'persons obstructing access to abortion clinics, ' we
think appellants have over-read what the Court
announced," the Second Circuit declared.
The ruling, written by a visiting judge, Louis H.
Pollak of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
requires fact-specific findings in two areas to permit
injunctions against abortion protesters based on
@1985(3) of Title 42, the so-called Ku Klux Klan
Act.
The first finding must be that targeted abortion
protesters are driven by an animus towards women;
the second, that they had a conscious objective to
inhibit certain constitutionally protected conduct, such
as the women's right to travel or to have an
abortion, Judge Pollak wrote.
His opinion, which also finds federal jurisdiction
over pendent state claims, was joined by Second
Circuit Judges Roger J. Miner and Amalya L.
Kearse. Judge Kearse was the author of a 1989
Second Circuit ruling that found anti- abortion
protesters to have an animus towards women, New
York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339.
Supporters of abortion rights hailed the ruling.
"It's very exciting the Second Circuit appears to be
taking a narrow view of Bray," said Ruth Jones, a
staff attorney at the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund in Manhattan.
Ms. Jones and Anthony F. Slez Jr., a Westport,
Conn. lawyer who intervened in the West Hartford
case on behalf of a group of women's, abortion
rights and civil rights groups, called the enunciated
requirements tough but possible to prove.
Critics, meanwhile, were skeptical and said the
animus inquiry was precluded by Bray. "Justice
[Antonin] Scalia couldn't have been clearer in finding
that opposition to abortion in the form of clinic
blockades, does not constitute an animus towards
women," said Vincent P. McCarthy, whose firm
McCarthy & Secola in New Milford, Conn.,
represented all but one of the defendants in the West
Hartford case.
While other circuits have split on the question of
jurisdiction over state c laims in abortion injunction
cases after Bray, only the Second Circuit held Klan
Act claims are permissible under certain
circumstances, Mr. McCarthy said.
Connecticut Case
The Second Circuit ruling came in a long-standing
dispute over an injunction imposed by Connecticut
District Judge Peter C. Dorsey following massive
anti- abortion demonstrations on April 1, 1989 and
June 17, 1989 at Summit Women's Center West
Inc. in West Hartford.
The protests, led by Operation Rescue, a leading
anti- abortion group, included mass picketing, an
occupation of the premises and the intervention of
approximately one-third of West Hartford's police
force.
In a lawsuit, first the town and then Summit
Women's Center sought injunctive and declaratory
relief against Operation Rescue and various protesters
including Operation Rescue's founder, Randall Terry.
They said the protesters' conduct was Hobbs Act
"extortion," racketeering, as well as a violation of the
Ku Klux Klan Act and various state laws.
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Judge Dorsey's permanent injunction came after he
granted summary judgment to the women's center on
the Klan Act claim and a Connecticut law claim of
tortious interference with business.
The Klan Act, enacted to protect blacks from the
Ku Klux Klan, bars conspiracies to deprive "any
person or class of persons" of the equal protection of
the laws. Supreme Court precedent has required
such conspiracies be "motivated by a class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus."
On appeal, the Operation Rescue defendants argued
that the West Hartford injunction must be lifted after
the Bray ruling barred a similar injunction restraining
protests outside nine women's medical facilities in the
northern Virginia/metropolitan Washington area.
Summarizing Bray, Judge Pollak wrote that the
Supreme Court held that "on those facts" the
plaintiffs had not established the invidious animus
ingredient of the Klan Act. The Court also held in
Bray that "women seeking abortion" are not a
protected class and that the plaintiffs had not
established that the protesters intended to hinder the
right to travel, Judge Pollak wrote.
But Judge Pollak wrote that under other
circumstances an injunction against abortion
protesters could be sustained under the Klan Act.
"We are of the view that the Court's analysis of the
animus aspect of Bray is tied to the facts there
adduced," he wrote.
He noted, for instance, that the Court never
reached the question of whether women - not women
seeking abortion - are a protected class. As a
result, he wrote, an injunction could be based on a
showing of a group's animus towards women and that
group's "conscious objective" of impairing a
constitutional right.
Those rights, he added, could be "either the
Fourteenth Amendment abortion right," or the
"citizenship right to travel without public or private
impediment."
Judge Pollak remanded the Hartford case for lower
court findings with respect to animus and the anti-
abortion group's motives.
Jon L. Schoenhorn and Pamela R. Hershinson of
Schoenhorn & Freeman in West Hartford,
represented Summit Women's Center. Mr.
McCarthy and Joseph P. Secola of McCarthy &
Secola in New Milford, Conn., represented all but
one of the defendants.
Mr. Slez of Slez and Slez in Westport, Conn.,
filed an amicus brief on behalf of various women's,
abortion rights, and civil rights groups.
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Civil Rights
Lesbian and Gay Rights
00ithe 1990s:,
At the Barricades
Kevin M. Cathcart and Evan Wolfson
If you're like most U.S. citizens,you don't spend a lot of time
worrying that you might lose your
job or your kids because of whom
you love. You don't worry that you will
be beaten in the streets because you're
holding hands with your life partner. Or
refused an opportunity to serve your
country in the armed forces because you
belong to a particular group. Or stig-
matized as a second-class citizen or pre-
sumed felon because the sex you enjoy
in the privacy of your own home is
illegal. Or denied a marriage license be-
cause you've chosen to marry the
"wrong kind" of person.
You may not worry about these things,
but many of your fellow citizens have
to. In the words of one court, "Despite
its irrelevance to individual merit, a ho-
mosexual or bisexual orientation invites
ongoing prejudice in all walks of life,
ranging from employment to education,
and for most of which there is currently
no judicial remedy."' The movement
for gay equality and legal rights is the
effort to secure for lesbian and gay peo-
ple what our nongay brothers and sisters
take for granted. Gay rights are nothing
more than nongay rights made available
to all.
How available are basic civil rights for
gay people? This is one answer: There
Kevin M. Cathcart is executive dirctor of
the Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund in New York City. Evan Wofion is
senior staff atorney at Lambda.
is still widespread discrimination in the
law, pervasive discrimination not reached
by the law, and no place in the country
where gay men and lesbians are treated
equally. This harsh reality is often not
understood. Gay people suffer not just
from the absence of laws that protect us,
but from outright discrimination against
us by our own government written into
law.
This is another answer, equally true:
Although many battles remain to be
fought, there are several trends in favor
of civil rights for, and equal treatment
of, gay people.2 These include the un-
precedented visibility of the reality and
diversity of lesbian and gay lives; increas-
ing (although still limited) political or-
ganization and access; the continuing
creation of vital lesbian and gay commu-
nity institutions; and a growing accep-
tance of gay co-workers, neighbors, fam-
ily members, professionals, and friends.
One sure sign of these trends is the ve-
hement backlash that they have evoked
from the reactionary right. Well-financed
groups have embarked on a nationwide
strategy of funding efforts to preempt
or overturn local civil rights protections
for lesbians and gay men by referenda
and forced repeal of legislation. The ref-
erenda campaigns under way in at least
11 states usually entail propaganda blitzes
ranging from outright lies and stereo-
types to the manipulation of Fabricated
statistics. Those behind these campaigns
mischaracterize their objective as merely
to eliminate "special rights" or "affirm-
ative action" based on sexual orienta-
ion, and some even foment violence.3
Combating these assaults on gay people's
humanity, let alone our civil rights, will
likely demand enormous resources from
gay and nongay citizens throughout the
1990s.
The temporary success of the anti-
equal-rights campaign in Colorado led
to a nationwide boycott of the state,
joined by several major cities, compa-
nies, and organizations, including the
U.S. Conference of Mayors.4 Fortunate-
ly, courts have repeatedly held that, as
a legal matter, the manipulation of the
political process and the singling out of
a minority group for discriminatory treat-
ment violate constitutional guarantees.
In a case brought by the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund-a gay
rights advocacy organization-and its al-
lies, a state court has invoked the U.S.
Constitution and enjoined Colorado's
antigay constitutional amendment.6
The "special rights" rhetoric of those
opposed to gay equality is, of course, a
calculated diversion. It made national
headlines when the Cracker Barrel res-
taurant chain announced that it had
fired several gay cooks and waiters and
would no longer employ people "whose
sexual preferences fail to demonstrate
normal heterosexual values which have
been the foundation of families in our
society."7
That such discrimination was deemed
newsworthy was remarkable in light of
the fact that it goes on all the time, vir-
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ruallv all across the country. Even more
remarkable was that Cracker Barrel re-
scinded its policy-not because it made
good corporate sense to treat cmployees
fairly (although it does) and not because
the law prohibited such blatant discrim-
ination (where they do business, it does
not), but solely because of public out-
cry. Not only was there no "special"
right protecting gay employees, there
was no legal protection at all.
Government Discrimination
So what does the landscape of legal
protections look like through gay eyes?
Lately there has been much attention
paid to President Clinton's announced
opposition to the military's gay exclu-
sion policy. Commentators have pointed
out that the arguments offered for keep-
ing the ban-those concerning asserted
security risks, shared showers, disease
risk, uncontrolled sexuality, and unit
cohesion-were also made against inte-
grating Afiican-Americans and women.8
Courts that have genuinely scrutinized
the military's consrantly shifting ratio-
nales have found the ban to be not sim-
ply unconstitutional, but irrational.9
The military ban is only the most glar-
ing example of affirmative government
discrimination against lesbians and gay
men. Towering over the landscape is the
U.S. Supreme Court's infamous deci-
sion in Bowers v. Hanwick. 1o In that
1986 case, the Court upheld the Georgia
"sodomv" law, which punished by up
to 20 years in prison private anal or oral
sex between married or unmarried adults,
male or female, gay or nongay.
The majority opinion has been widely
criticized for its lack of reasoning" and,
in the words of the dissent, for its "al-
most obsessive focus on homosexual ac-
tivity."12 It was repudiated by Justice
Lewis Powell, the "swing vote," after
he left the Court. Still, Haniwick has
provided an excuse for judges who
would prefer to rubber-stamp discrimi-
nation rather than protect members of
a vulnerable or controversial group.'3
The government also discriminates
against gay men and lesbians in employ-
ment. The public sector encompasses
civilian employees as well as workers
needing security clearances and those
employed by the military. Only with re-
gard to the former have there been solid
legal gains. The federal civil service, fol-
lowing court decisions,1 has adopted a
standard that provides some protection
to lesbian and gay employees."
In theory, a gay or lesbian sexual ori-
entation itself is not grounds for termi-
nation or adverse employment decisions
without a showing that the decision is
related to a legitimate government pur-
pose. In practice, however, this principle
is often violated, particularly in certain
jobs like teaching16 or those requiring
security ccarance. 7
Outside of employment, the picture
is even grimmer. The lives and needs of
gay people are routinely neglected in the
formulation of federal policy and the
provision of government services. A
presidential executive order banning dis-
crimination in federal employment and
services is long overdue. At the state and
local level, affirmative discrimination
takes the form of police harassment of
gay people,' 8 and there is virtually no
effort to address the needs of lesbians
and gay men in social and youth ser-
vices, family support and recognition,
housing, or representation in education-
al materials and discussions.
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As for the private sector, to date feder-
al civil rights law does not shield people
from discrimination based on their sex-
ual orientation.' 9 Gay people's protec-
tion against even the crudest bigotry
often depends on whether we live or
work in a state or city that enforces our
civil rights.
Eight states-California, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin-and
the District of Columbia have adopted
some form of protective legislation. 20
Seven acted within the past four years,
part of the surge in recognition of the
need for and merits of protection against
antigay discrimination. The governors
of several other states have issued execu-
A
Antigay Hatred Plagues Iowa Town
Mayor Bill Crews of Melbourne, lowa,
came out of the closet in April while
in Washington, D.C., for the gay
rights march.
During a gay victory luncheon at
the Capital Hilton, Crews, 40, was
introduced as "the country's newest
'out' public official." (William Souder,
Heartland of Darkness, Wash. Post,
May 19, 1993, at Bl.) Life will prob-
ably never be the same for Crews and
his companion, Steve Kehoe.
When they returned home, they
discovered their house had been de-
faced with antigay graffiti. In two-
foot-high letters were vicious messages
like "No faggots," "Queers aret [sic]
welcome" and "Melbourne hates gays.
Get out!" (Crews is pictured above
at the back of the house.)
Workers tried to remove the graffiti
but could not erase it completely. A
$2,500 reward has been offered for
information leading to an arrest, and
the matter remains under investigation.
Crews told the Washington Post that
he wanted to come out for years but
waited until Kehoc was readv. "Be-
ing our gics the people who know
me the opportunity to think before
their prejudices come into play," he
said. "I want to be able to share my
life with my friends and neighbors in
the usual way."
Hate crimes based on sexual orien-
tation are on the rise, according to
the Southern Poverty Law Center in
Montgomery, Alabama. The center
attributed the increase to ballot issues
affecting gays and lesbians in several
states, combined with antigay rher-
onic nationwide. (See Hate Cimes
Against Gays Rise, Klanwatch Intelli-
gence Report, Feb. 1993, at 8.)
Kchoc emphasized that he and
Crews lead lives no diffennt than the
central Iowa town's 667 other resi-
dents-chey rnow the lawn, the, work,
they car dinner. Apparently neither
he nor Crews regrets coming out.
"The main reason we did this was
to combat gay hatred," Kehoc said.
"And it does feel good." C
-Renec Coider
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tive 4.ders banning discrimination in
government employment and the pro-
vision of state services. 21
More than 100 localities across the
country-from New York to Los Angeles,
from Seattle to Atlanta, from Tucson to
Chicago-also prohibit certain kinds of
discrimination against lesbians and gay
men. More than two dozen states, cit-
ies, and counties have included sexual
orientation in laws punishing hate crimes
and violence. As a result of this dramatic
movement toward equal rights, more
than one-third of the U.S. population
n0ow resides in jurisdictions covered by
antidiscrimination ordinances, which
vary widely in their scope and power.22
Although local efforts to secure some
civil rights for lesbian and gay citizens
are no substitute for federal protection,
state courts are stepping in to fill the
void created by the federal judiciary's re-
cent abdication of its historic role of
protecting minorities against discrimina-
tion. Courts in Kentucky, Michigan,
and Texas, for exanmple, have struck down
their state sodomy laws, one making a
specific point of repudiating Hardwick.2 1
Other courts have become far more re-
ceptive to creative advocacy extending
existing law. In one case, a gay man won
a substantial judgment against Shell Oil
Co. when he was fired for off-duty con-
duct in violation of a company policy,
even though there was no anridiscrimi-
nation ordinance in Alameda County,
California, at the time.2 '
Protecting Relationships
Naturally, our struggle is not confined
to our needs as individuals. Gay people
share with our nongay counterparts an
interest in being protected as partners
in committed relationships and as mem-
bers of families, often with children.
Lesbians and gay men today are contest-
ing the unconstitutional imposition of
an "opposite-sex restriction" on our
right to choose our marital partners,
which is as offensive as the "same-race
restriction" imposed before Loving v.
Virginia. 25
We are also fighting for health benefits
for our loved ones, using legal avenues
provided by antidiscrimination laws, 26
domestic partnership laws,2 7 and collec-
tive bargaining.28 Concerned for our
children, we work-often in the Face of
hostile social institutions, schools, and
judges-to obtain the legal rights and re-
sponsibilities (including custody, visita-
tion, and child support) automatically
given nongay parents.29
In the landmark case ofIn e Kowalski,
Karen Thompson won a seven-year court
battle to be awarded guardianship of her
life partner, Sharon Kowalski, who had
suffered severe brain injury in an auto-
mobile accident. They would never have
had to fight this battle had they been
permitted to marry or had the law and
Kowalski's biological family members
recognized their relationship from the
start. The court finally concluded that
Thompson and Kowalski "are a family
of affinity, which ought to be accorded
respect." 0
Similarly, New York State's highest
court recognized the committed and in-
terdependent nature of a gay family in
Bnuschi v. Stahl Associates Co. The court
held that "the term family . . . should
not be rigidly restricted to those people
who have formalized their relationship
by obtaining, for instance, a marriage
certificate or an adoption order."3 1 This
is an issue of vital importance fbr gay
people, who are universally denied the
former and often the latter as weil. In
.eermining whether a family relation-
ship exists, the court required an assess-
ment of I
a number of factors, including the ex-
clusivitv and longevity of the relation-
ship, the level of emotional and finan-
cial commitment, the manner in which
the parties have conducted their every-
day lives and held themselves out to
society, and the reliance placed upon
one another for daily and family ser-
vices. These factors are most helpful,
although it should be emphasized that
the presence or absence of one or
more of them is not dispositive since
it is the totality of the relationship as
evidenced by the dedication, caring,
and self-sacrifice of the parties which
should, in the final analysis, control.32
These decisions show both how far
lesbians and gay men have come and
how far we still have to go in obtaining
equal rights to live securely, supported
by the law, with those individuals whom
we love.
As if these denials of our basic equality
and civil rights were not enough, the
AIDS epidemic has brought with it an
epidemic of antigay discrimination re-
lated to the disease." Many people
believe that our countrv's failure to re-
spond intelligently and compassionately
to HIV was due to its early appearance
among gay men and others not valued
by this society.)
In a recent case challenging the ex-
clusion of gay people from a Boston
St. Patrick's Day parade subsidized by
city funds, one judge wrote:
It seems that societies have a persistent
but perverse need to exclude and per-
secute certain of their members. In
even its mildest form, this need is usu-
ally manifested as hate toward a spe-
cific segment or group. It makes them
into demons. I cannot explain it, but
I know it when I see it or hear it. This
list of demons is long, and this case
illustrates the capacity of individuals
to forget the past. However, it pays
to remember who is (or has been) on
that list: Jews, women, Christians,
blacks, abolitionists, Quakers, witches,
Irish, Roman Catholics, communists,
Asians, welfare recipients, pro-choice
advocates, Haitians, and now these
[lesbian and gay] plaintiffs. When will
it end? It was wrong then, wrong now,
and can never be right. Bigotry in any
form is an obscenity. As a human be-
ing, not as a judge, I pray that one day
hate and fear as well as discrimination
against members of a group just be-
cause they are members of a group-
those allied obscenities that have
plagued us for too long-will, like the
dinosaur, be only a distant memory."
In the words of gay activist Melvin
Boozer, an African-American, to the
Democratic National Convention in
1980: "1 know what it means to be
called a nigger and I know what it
means to be called a figgor, and I can
sum up the difference in one word:
none." 6 Advocates for equality and hu-
man dignity have their work cut out for
them as the gay rights movement steps
up to the front line in the 1990s.
This effort is nothing special-it is just
the same old human rights fight. Like
those who fought previous struggles for
African-Americans, women, and other
persecuted people, we, our loved ones,
our allies, and those committed to true
democratic and family values must not
faili.
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COURT FIGHT VOWED ON GAY POLICY;
EXPERTS BELIEVE A LEGAL CHALLENGE IS UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
BUT OPPONENTS OF THE BAN BELIEVE THAT TIME
IS ON THEIR SIDE AS JUSTICES AND ATTITUDES CHANGE.
By DAVID G. SAVAGE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
Copyright 1993 The Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times
July 20, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
Gay rights attorneys vowed Monday to go to court
to fight President Clinton's decision to maintain the
military's ban on open homosexuals, but such a legal
challenge is not likely to succeed in the Supreme
Court, at least in the near future, legal experts said.
"In principle, they have some strong arguments
against (the ban on gays) but it would be surprising
for this court to accept them," said University of
Chicago law professor Cass Sunstein, who in law
review articles has urged the courts to take a new
look at issues of sexual orientation.
Gay rights lawyers contend that the military's
revised policy is unconstitutional both because it
denies homosexuals the "equal protection of the laws"
and because it violates their free-speech rights. If
they discuss their sexual orientation openly, those
comments can lead to dismissal.
"This is a classic civil rights issue for the courts
because (the military's policy) is based on an
irrational prejudice," said William Rubenstein,
director of the ACLU's Lesbian and Gay Rights
Project.
The gay-rights activists have been cheered by
recent federal court rulings in California that have
undercut the military's strict ban on gays in the
ranks.
In one case, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
said that the policy cannot stand unless the Pentagon
offers a more convincing "rational basis" for it.
Government lawyers have not yet supplied their
defense. In a second case, U.S. District Judge Terry
J. Hatter Jr. in Los Angeles flatly declared the
military's discharge policy unconstitutional. His
ruling now is being appealed.
Despite those successes, gay-rights advocates have
yet to gain even a hearing before the Supreme Court,
whose members have refused to hear appeals from
gays discharged from the armed services.
A legal challenge to the military's ban faces two
high hurdles in the Supreme Court.
First, the justices traditionally defer to the wishes
of the military. They have consistently refused to
strike down policies set by military commanders,
even when they appear to clearly violate the
constitutional rights of service personnel.
For example, the court in 1984 rejected a Jewish
officer's request to wear a yarmulke while on duty.
In a lower court ruling, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg
ruled that this policy violated his rights to religious
freedom but the high court disagreed. Speaking for
the court, Justice William H. Rehnquist stressed that
the military's prerogatives outweigh the rights of
service personnel.
Second, the court has refused to say that
governmental discrimination based on sexual
orientation violates the Constitution even for civilians.
While the 14th Amendment broadly speaks of
ensuring every person the "equal protection of the
laws," the court has interpreted that command rather
narrowly. Government discrimination based on race
or gender is "suspect," the court has said, and should
be prohibited in nearly all instances.
But the court has refused to bar other types of
discrimination based, for example, on age, wealth or
disability.
Eventually, gay rights lawyers hope to convince
the Supreme Court that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is "suspect" also and should be
banned.
In the meantime, they hope to persuade the court
that a policy requiring the discharge of open gays is
not rational and therefore, should be struck down.
A government policy "can't be based on irrational
stereotypes," said Kevin Cathcart, executive director
of the Lambda Legal Defense Fund. The court has
long taken the view in equal protection cases that
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governments can discriminate or make distinctions
among people provided the laws are not arbitrary or
irrational.
For the gay legal advocates, time may be on their
side.
"If the litigation can be strung out over five years
or longer, it (the military's ban) will be struck
down, " predicted Georgetown law professor Mark
Tushnet. "The court's composition will be changing
and public attitudes are changing." In the long run,
he said, the justices will not want to endorse a
blatantly discriminatory policy against one category
of citizens.
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White House Plans to Fight For Discharge of Gay Sailor
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Section 1; Page 10; Column 1
The Clinton Administration argued in a court brief today that the old Pentagon ban on homosexuals was
constitutional and indicated that it would continue fighting for the discharge of a gay sailor.
In a brief filed here in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Administration criticized
Judge Terry J. Hatter Jr. of Federal District Court for overturning the discharge of Keith Meinhold, a sonar
operator at Moffett Field Naval Air Station in Mountain View, Calif.
The Defense Department discharged Mr. Meinhold last August after he disclosed in a national television
interview that he was homosexual. He was reinstated in January on Judge Hatter's orders.
The Clinton Justice Department argued that Judge Hatter's decision overstepped his judicial authority by making
decisions that fall in the jurisdiction of the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government.
Furthermore, the brief argued, "the District Court's ruling may interfere with implementation of the President's
new policy regarding homosexuality in the military" because of an implication that the court's decision in the
Meinhold case could be construed to mean that the new policy first had to be reviewed by the court.
Under President Clinton's compromise policy, homosexuality will still be grounds for discharge, although the
military will not ask incoming men and women whether they are homosexuals or lesbians. The policy will be
effective on Oct. 1.
After reviewing the Administration's brief, Mr. Meinhold's lawyer, John I. McGuire, said the Government's
legal arguments today indicated little difference between the old and new policies.
"Here the Clinton Administration is claiming before the courts that they are not kicking gays out, but then they
defend the old rule," Mr. McGuire said in a telephone interview.
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DAY OF JUDGMENT FOR GAY BAN
BY WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN
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After six months of bitter political rancor but little
substantive change, the issue of gays in the military
is now shifting back to the courts, where it has been
debated for more than a quarter century. This
homecoming will present unique challenges to several
institutions: the Clinton administration and its
Department of Justice; the lower federal courts; and,
ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court.
To the Clinton administration, the shift back to the
courts will be a true test of its principles.
For the last 12 years, the Justice Department took
the position in a series of cases involving lesbian and
gay employees in the military, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and security positions that
sexual-orientation discrimination triggers nothing
more than rational-basis review under the
equal-protection clause, and that hostility toward
lesbians and gay men is sufficient to meet this
minimum standard of constitutional protection. The
result is a body of constitutional doctrine that offers
essentially no protection against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. The Clinton Justice
Department, forced to dofend the constitutionality of
the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, will be hard
pressed to do so without taking a legal position that
perpetuates this destructive approach.
It is ironic that the Clinton administration has
positioned itself to contribute to this legacy. This is,
after all, a president who assiduously sought the gay
vote during his campaign, spoke articulately about the
principle of equality for gay people, and placed
gay people in his administration. And the Justice
Department is now run by, among others, liberal
academics - like Solicitor General Drew Days III
and the director-designate of the Office of Legal
Counsel, Walter Dellinger - who in other situations
have professed sympathy with the ideals of
non-discrimination.
The ideal, of course, would be if the Justice
Department simply capitulated and honestly told its
client and the federal courts that the military ban is
not constitutional. Short of that unlikely scenario,
Justice could mitigate the damage by conceding that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
entitled to more than rational-basis review under the
Constitution; by carefully circumscribing its
arguments to the military context; and by taking
seriously its authority to affect how the military
actually treats lesbians and gay men.
Whatever position the administration takes, the
federal courts will be forced to decide the
constitutionality of the new policy, as well as a
number of pending cases challenging the old policy.
Because this issue has been litigated for more than 25
years, the courts will not be writing on a blank slate.
While there obviously has not been a final decision
declaring the ban unconstitutional, a number of
interim judicial opinions have done so, including
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988). (Although this panel decision was vacated en
banc, Watkins did prevail in his case against the
military on non-constitutional grounds. Watkins v.
U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc),
making Watkins the only gay service member ever
to win a final victory against the military. )
Most recently, the 9th Circuit held that the
equal-protection clause requires the military to
establish, through a factual record, that its policy is
indeed rationally related to a permissible purpose
other than prejudice. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d
1160 (9th Cir. 1991). Applying Pruitt, a federal
district judge in Los Angeles, in Meinhold v. U.S.
Department of Defense, 808 F.Supp. 1455 (C.D. Ca.
1993), struck down the ban earlier this year after
finding no factual basis to support it, in a decision
now on appeal to the 9th Circuit.
Clear Prejudice
Challenges to the Clinton policy will draw on these
precedents; but these arguments will be bolstered by
the clear prejudice that has been demonstrated in this
six-month political debate. For instance, previous
cases have failed to establish that the ban violates the
First Amendment. In Pruitt and Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), appellate
courts rejected the argument that "coming out" was
protected speech; these courts held that gay service
members were not being discharged for their speech,
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but because their speech revealed information
rendering them unfit for military service. Now, the
policy itself and the political debate have
demonstrated that it is not homosexuality that is
incompatible with military service, but rather
speech about homosexuality and what that speech
reveals to others.
Once it is clear to the courts that the military's
policy is aimed directly at speech, they will have to
decide if the government violates the First
Amendment by permitting speech about sexual
orientation as long as the speech reveals a
heterosexual orientation, but not if it reveals a
homosexual orientation. This is viewpoint-based
censorship - like permitting Catholic soldiers to
identify their religion publicly, but not allowing
Jewish soldiers to do so - that should trigger close
constitutional review.
The government's central defense to these
arguments will be that the courts have long deferred
to the military on personnel issues, that speech
rights of service members are limited and that
disruption is a satisfactory government reason for
limiting speech. While these are difficult hurdles,
they are surmountable.
In last year's Supreme Court decision striking
down St. Paul, Minn.'s hate-speech ordinance, R. A.
V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), Justice
Antonin Scalia wrote for the Court that content-based
censoring distinctions - even regarding what has
been traditionally considered unprotected speech -
trigger the closest judicial scrutiny. Thus, while
soldiers' speech rights may be limited, the military
is not entitled to select who may speak about their
sexual orientation according to whether it approves of
the sexual orientation or not. Nor can the
government simply fall back on disruption when an
alternative less harsh than discharge (such as strong
leadership) could curb the disruption.
Any policy that does not grant equality to gay
service members also violates the equal-protection
clause, which requires that individuals be judged
according to their abilities and not according to the
group to which they belong. Courts must force the
government tojustify group-based distinctions and, at
the very least, should require the government to
demonstrate that its gay policy is rationally related
to a legitimate government interest. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that catering to the prejudices
of others is not a legitimate government interest; on
this basis, it overruled a Texas city's decision to deny
a special-use permit for the operation of a group
home for the mentally retarded in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). This
is the reasoning applied by the 9th Circuit in last
year's Pruitt decision, which has now been sent back
to the District Court with instructions to put the
government to the test of showing that its policy is
not based on prejudice, and by the District Court in
the Meinhold case.
Several other appellate courts - including the 7th
Circuit in Ben-Shalom and the Federal Circuit in
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) - have rejected equal-protection
challenges to the old military regulations. Those
courts ruled that the military's litany of "discipline,
good order and morale" was a sufficient, legitimate
basis for banning lesbians and gay men. They did
not, however, focus on the link between the "good
order" argument and prejudice: the reason "good
order" will be upset by gay soldiers is only because
of the assumed prejudices of others. The political
debate of the past six months has made this
connection more apparent. That debate, and the
"don't ask, don't tell" formula, highlight this link, for
it is now conceded that gay people are not
disruptive of good order unless and until others know
of our presence.
A fair application of equal-protection principles,
then, should result in striking down the ban, since
nothing more than the supposed dislike of gay
people has surfaced to support the argument that
combat effectiveness would be impaired by lesbian
and gay personnel. Whether the courts will agree
with this position is, of course, impossible to predict,
and federal judges around the country are likely to
rule differently on the constitutional claims, as they
have for the past quarter century. This uncertainty
means that the final word will probably rest with the
Supreme Court.
What will the current - and prospective -
Supreme Court justices do if they agree to rule on the
legality of the military's gay ban? Three justices
(William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence
Thomas) are predictably lost causes, while two
(Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens) would
probably be sympathetic. That leaves three in the
middle (Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,
and David Souter); two of them have ruled against
gay claimants while on other courts, Kennedy in a
9th Circuit decision upholding the military ban,
Souter in a New Hampshire Supreme Court case
upholding a state law that prohibited lesbians and
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gay men from adopting and becoming foster parents.
Nonetheless, given the performance of these
moderate justices in recent controversial cases (such
as Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992), the 1992 challenge to the Pennsylvania
abortion law) one can hope they will approach the
issue with open minds. And even in upholding New
Hampshire's gay -adoption ban, the decision Souter
joined was careful to distinguish homosexual conduct
from homosexual status, a critical distinction in the
military debate. Additionally, if the issue reaches
the Court framed as a First Amendment question,
Scalia and Kennedy might be more sympathetic to
arguments to strike down the ban, as they have been
most protective of individual freedoms arising from
the First Amendment.
The Deciding Vote?
If two of the swing votes could be found to join
with Blackmun and Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
would become the deciding vote. What would she
do? In her confirmation hearings, Ginsburg espoused
the general principle that rank discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is deplorable. But in
1984, she sided with a conservative bloc of the U.S.
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia not to
rehear a case rejecting a constitutional challenge to
the military ban. Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (enbanc). Ginsburg's decision
was framed as a narrow holding about how a prior
Supreme Court precedent bound her to reach this
result. It nonetheless infuriated her liberal colleagues
because she went out of her way to duck the
constitutional issues presented. Now that she has
been elevated to the Supreme Court, she won't be
able to duck the issue anymore.
The military issue is certain to become the test of
what our Constitution means. Will it be interpreted
as a living document that can protect minorities from
prejudicial decision-making? Or will the Justice
Department and the judiciary continue to make the
Constitution a hollow promise to gay people?
William B. Rubenstein, the director of the Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union in New York, is counsel in a suit
filed last week in U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia challenging the policy discussed in this
article.
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The first political supernova of the new year
exploded with much heat and some light. Now the
fragments of common sense are falling slowly back
into place. Still, anyone who goes in for brain
twisters - such as spherical discussions on the
metaphysical coherence of psyche, identity, behavior,
gestalt - or who loves a good non sequitur as much as
a good pun, stay tuned. We have graduated to the
politics of pretending.
Pop quiz. A recent policy proposal on
homosexuals in the military says, "Sexual orientation
is not a bar to entry or continued service." It also
says, "homosexuality is incompatible with military
service," but the concerns of homosexuals who are in
the military despite that fact will be "accommodated."
Taken together, these statements are: (a) logically
inconsistent; (b) legally indefensible; (c) the political
equivalent of a messy shotgun wedding; (d) all of the
above.
Note: This is a dangerous question. The danger
lies in the fact that the subtleties of gestalt-speak on
Friday will become the hammer of rights-speak on
Monday.
Consider the competing goals. The pertinent goal
of the homosexual community is to continue in
homosexual conduct and, in fact, to gain some
measure of social approval for it. Homosexuals, as
they have readily said, are not fighting for the right
to remain celibate.
The military's goal, conversely, is to avoid - or at
least minimize - homosexual conduct and its
associated effects within the armed forces. This is
based on the observation that homosexuality causes a
variety of social, political and health and wel-fare
risks to military team cohesion, and hence to combat
readiness. In the crucible of the real world, a single
time-tested solution has emerged: the most practical,
logical, legally defensible - and fair - way to
accomplish the military's goal is to exclude
homosexuals.
This is one of those rare quesions where there is
no common ground between conflicting objectives -
if policies are to be based on the facts of life, rather
than legal fictions. The reality is that, as a group,
homosexuals are likely to engage in homosexual
conduct. (Indeed, celibacy is so politically incorrect,
a great debate rages on whether it is even legal to
suggest abstinence in sex education.) Thus, the law as
well as common sense tell us that "orientation" and
"conduct" are a continuum, not random person-parts
subject to mix and match at will.
Now, with the stroke of a pen, policy-makers
propose to pretend otherwise - thus creating the legal
fiction that homosexual "orientation" is a discreet,
disembodied entity that mandates special protection.
Of course, this requires certain mental gymnastics,
not the least of which is ignoring the behavior
associated with that orientation and the truth that
orientation is an aspect of a whole person who lives
in a real world. Fiats, however, cannot change facts.
Homosexual orientation and homosexual conduct
are in fact inseparably linked. Therefore, as the legal
cases have recognized, the military cannot protect
homosexual "orientation" without tacitly approving of
homosexual conduct. The choice in this matter is
clear. The choice is between exclusion of
homosexuals and full, open acceptance of
homosexuals and homosexual conduct within the
military.
While it may be tantalizing to dodge the hard
questions about homosexual conduct - and its legal,
moral, social and political implications for military
team cohesion - the fact remains it is impossible to
take a stand on homosexuals in the military without
taking a stand on homosexual conduct. Sexual
"orientation" ordinances often have been used to
shield conduct, and with some merit: could the
military defend a policy of inviting homosexuals to
serve and then discharging them because, predictably,
they act out their now-protected identity?
This is precisely how any policy attempt to create
"orientation" in the abstract instead creates a way to
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torpedo the legal and logical bases for regulating the
conduct that defines that orientation. After all,
donning a battle-dress uniform does not involve the
same vows as donning the cloth.
No doubt some will say this is just more of the
same. What's the difference between today's policy
excluding homosexuals, which some homosexuals
evade on their own initiative, and a policy statement
that homosexual orientation - "strictly speaking" - is
not a bar to military service?
The devil is in the details. Quite simply, the
difference is that under the new policy the military
would be giving homosexuals a measure of equity in
their service. (Lawyers, man your guns.)
Homosexuals would have a newly minted right to
serve, albeit under unrealistic, impractical, and
logically inconsistent conditions.
Before, those homosexuals who were undeterred
by the exclusion policy, like others who are
undeterred by any one of the military's many
exclusion rules, simply made a personal decision to
take their chances. They assumed all the risk of their
personal gamble, including the serious risk that
celibate resolve, hiding or luck would fail them.
Under a policy stating homosexual orientation is
not a bar to military service - that is, a policy
bestowing the coveted imprimatur of the State on
homosexuality - the military would assume the risk of
paying up. That is, once granting homosexuals a
right to serve, the military would assume the risk of
homosexual conduct and its associated effects on the
armed forces. "Assumption of the risk" generally
means the one who took the risk bought the
consequences. In other words, good luck explaining
how policy-makers missed the warning signs.
The proposed policy clearly - and understandably,
under the press of politics - is trying to be the old
policy in drag. But in the process of dressing
up this political brainchild, the baby has been thrown
out with the bath water. War-fighting - from the
recruiting station to the battlefield - demands the guts
to look stark realities directly in the eye. At a
minimum, this means rejecting the politics of
pretending. It means facing up to the tough calls on
what's best for fighting and winning this nation's
wars.
Melissa Wells-Petry is a major in the U.S. Army
and the author of "Exclusion: Homosexuals and the
Right to Serve."
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COLORADO'S HIGH COURT UNDERCUTS ANTI-GAY RIGHTS AMENDMENT
By Lyle Denniston, Washington Bureau
Baltimore Morning Sun
July 20, 1993
WASHINGTON - Colorado's highest state court,
in a wide-ranging victory for gay people, ruled 6-1
yesterday that the U.S. Constitution gives homosexual
men and women a clear right to seek new laws to
protect them from bias.
In a decision that very likely will mean the end
of an amendment put into the Colorado constitution
last year to forbid all legal protection for gays, the
state Supreme Court defined a new right the U.S.
Supreme Court has never recognized.
That is a right for lesbians and gay men to take
part in all of the processes of government "on an
even footing with others, " without being
discriminated against because of their sexual lives.
The ruling came in the first stage of a broad
constitutional challenge to Colorado's new anti-gay
"Amendment 2," a change in the state constitution
made by a vote of the people in the state, on a 53-47
percent margin. The amendment bars any branch of
the state and local governments in Colorado from
adopting any policy or law that would give gays
"protected status" or shield them from discrimination.
That amendment, blocked temporarily in January
by a state judge, would have wiped out gay rights
laws in Denver and other Colorado cities.
The Colorado provision has become a rallying
point for gay rights groups nationally, who staged a
boycott of the state as part of their campaign.
The state Supreme Court decision yesterday,
although a preliminary decision, indicated strongly
that Amendment 2 would not be able to survive the
constitutional challenge against it when a lawsuit goes
to trial in October.
State officials indicated that they may take the
dispute on to the U.S. Supreme Court, perhaps
without even waiting for that trial.
Colorado's highest court based its decision on the
14th Amendment's promise of legal equality for all
persons, saying that clause "guarantees the
fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process."
Thus, it said, any attempt to put limits on that right
may be upheld only if necessary for the operation of
government.
"Laws may not create unequal burdens on
identifiable groups with respect to the right to
participate in the political process," unless the need
to impose such burdens is strong and clear-cut, it
said.
It said that Amendment 2 was designed not only to
force the repeal of existing gay rights laws in
Colorado cities, but also to prohibit any level of the
government from passing any more such laws in the
future - unless the state constitution were amended
to allow that.
The amendment "bars gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals from having an effective voice in
governmental affairs" if they try to obtain passage of
gay rights laws or policies in the state, it said.
"Amendment 2 expressly fences out an independently
identifiable group" who could benefit from laws to
forbid discrimination against them for their sexual
orientation or practices.
The decision stressed that gay people do not have
a right to be assured that gay rights laws would be
passed, but have only a right to seek such laws from
their government.
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